State v. Jockumsen Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 34581 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-21-2009
State v. Jockumsen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34581
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Jockumsen Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34581" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1938.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1938
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) NO. 34581 
) 
VS . 
MICHAEL L. JOCKUMSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
HONORABLE RONALD BUSH 
District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN SARAH E. TOMPKINS 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-271 2 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF- RESPONDENT 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..............................  ............................................. 1 
Statement of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ........................................ 1 
................................................................................................................ ISSUE 4 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 5 
1 . Jockumsen Waived His Fifth Amendment Right Against 
Self-Incrimination by Failing to Assert It .......................................... 5 
A . Introduction ........................................................................... 5 
B . Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment Claim Is Not 
Preserved For Appeal ........................................................... 6 
C . Jockumsen Waived The Fifth Amendment Privilege 
.................. Against Self-Incrimination By Failing to Assert It 8 
I 1  . Jockumsen Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
..................................... Abused Its Discretion Under I.C. $18-215 12 
A . Introduction ......................................................................... 12
B . Standard of Review ........................................................ 12 
C . Jockumsen's I.C. $18-215 Claim Is Not Preserved 
For Appeal ........................................................................ 13 
D . Even If Jockumsen's I.C. $18-215 Claim Were 
Preserved, He Has Failed To Show That The District 
............................. Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 13 
E . Any Abuse of Discretion Or Violation Of I.C. $18-215 
Was Harmless ................................................................. 16 
1. In Reaching Its Sentencing Decision, The District 
...... Court Analyzed The Proper Sentencing Factors I 7  
2. The Information From Jockumsen's Competency 
Evaluations Referenced By The District Court 
......................... Was Available From Other Sources 18 
3. Jockumsen's Sentence And The Relinquishment 
Of His Jurisdiction Was Supported 
By The Record ......................................................... 22
Ill. Jockumsen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court 
Manifestly Disregarded The Provisions of I.C.R. 32 Or 
Abused Its Discretion By Failing To Sua Sponfe Order 
a Psychological Evaluation In Aid Of Sentencing .......................... 23 
A. Introduction ......................................................................... 23 
............................................................ B. Standard of Review 23
C. Jockumsen Has Failed To Establish That 
The District Court Manifestly Disregarded 
................................................ The Provisions Of I.C.R. 32 23 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 27 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .................. .. ...................................................... 27 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
. ............... Illinois v Perkins 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (citing Miranda 384 U.S. at 445) 9 
. . ..................... Madison v Craven, 144 Idaho 696. 169 P.3d 284 (Ct App . 2007) 11 
...................................................... . Minnesota v Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1 984) 8,9 
. ............................ State v Calley, 140 Idaho 663, 665-666, 99 P.3d 616 (2004) 12 
. ....................................... State v Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 162 P.3d 787 (2007) 23 
. ......................................... State v C o ~ e ,  142 Idaho 492, 129 P.3d 1241 (2006) 16 
. . ....................... . State v Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 44 P.3d 1193 (Ct App 2002) 8 , 9  
. ................................. State v Doe, 123 Idaho 370, 848 P.2d 428, 429 (1993) 6, 13 
. ................................... State v Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 630 P.2d 665, 674 (1 981) 6
. .................................. State v Haaaard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971) 6 
. ................................ State v Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 57 P.3d 782, 785 (2002) 13 
. . . .................. State v Jones, 132 Idaho 439, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct App 1999) 23, 24 
............ . ............... State v Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992) . 6 
. . . ...................... State v Morgan, 109 Idaho 1040, 712 P.2d 741 (Ct App 1985.) 16 
. . . ..................... State v Newsom, 135 Idaho 89, 14 P.3d 1083 (Ct App 2000) 6, 13 
. . . ................. State v Schumacher, 131 Idaho 484, 959 P.2d 465 (Ct App 1998) 12 
. State v Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 284, 77 P.3d 956 (2003) ............................... 12 
. . . ....................... State v Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 667 P.2d 272 (Ct App 1983) 16 
State v . Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707, 708 (Ct . App . 1982) ................... 24 
. ................................... State v Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 563 P.2d 42, 44 (1977) 6 
Nature of the Case 
Michael L. Jockumsen appeals from the judgment and sentence imposed 
upon his guilty plea to attempted strangulation, and from the district court's 
relinquishment of jurisdiction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In July 2006, Michael Jockumsen held Teresa Blackhawk captive in a 
residence and attempted to strangle her. (R., pp.17-18.) Jockumsen accused 
Blackhawk, his girlfriend, of cheating on him. (Id.) Jockumsen tightened his 
hands around Blackhawk's neck to the point where she was unable to breath. 
(R., p.18.) After preventing Blackhawk from leaving the house, Jockurnsen let 
himself out, only to return later through a window. (Id.) Blackhawk and a friend 
attempted to escape in a car, but Jockumsen entered the vehicle's backseat and 
refused to leave. (Id.) Jockumsen later forced Blackhawk out of the vehicle, and 
down the street, on foot. (R., p.19.) Jockumsen repeatedly told Blackhawk that 
she was free to leave, but physically grabbed her when she attempted to do so. 
(Id.) After several hours, Blackhawk managed to escape when her sister and 
mother arrived on the scene and pulled her into another vehicle. (Id.) 
Jockumsen was charged with second degree kidnapping and attempted 
strangulation. (R., pp.48-49.) The district court granted defense counsel's 
motion for a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. Ij 18-211. (R., pp.34-35.) 
The evaluator determined that Jockurnsen was not competent to stand trial, and 
recommended that Jockumsen be referred for additional psychiatric evaluation 
and treatment. (PSI attachment, 10130/06 Dr. Christensen evaluation, p.5.) The 
3 
district court committed Jockurnsen to the Department of Health and Welfare. 
(R., pp.53-54.) 
Three subsequent evaluators concluded that Jockurnsen was malingering, 
i.e. "intentionally providing false or grossly exaggerated information regarding 
psychiatric symptoms for secondary gain" (813107 letter from Dr. Perrien), and 
two of the evaluators opined that Jockurnsen was competent to stand trial. (PSI 
attachment, 12/13/06 letter from Joyce Carson, 11/27/06 letter from Joyce 
Carson, 11/14/06 Dr. Gligorovic evaluation, 2/1/07 letter from Dr. Christensen; 
2/14/07 Tr., p.5, L.5 - p.13, L.22.) With no objection or dissenting argument from 
either party, the court deemed Jockumsen competent to stand trial. (2/14/07 Tr., 
p.14, L.14-p.18, L.24.) 
Jockumsen entered a guilty plea to attempted strangulation, and in 
exchange for his plea the state dismissed the kidnapping charge. (214107 Tr., 
p.20, Ls.13 - p.33, L.16.) Jockumsen's competency evaluations were attached 
to the PSI. (See generally, PSI attachment.) Jockumsen was sentenced to eight 
years, with three years fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction. (R., 
pp.66-67.) 
Before the rider review hearing, but after providing notice to both parties, 
the district court sent Jockumsen's competency evaluations to Dr. Mary Perrien 
at the Idaho Department of Correction. (419107 Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.20, L.8; 8/6/07 
Tr., p.l, L.18 - p.2, L.5.) The court requested that Dr. Perrien consider 
Jockumsen's mental health situation, and provide the court with an opinion 
regarding whether Jockurnsen might be successful on probation. (419107 Tr., 
p.19, L.20 - p.20, L.4; 8/3/07 letter from Dr. Perrien.) Citing the evaluators' 
conclusion of malingering, her own conclusion that Jockumsen was rationalizing 
his negative behavior and not taking responsibility for his crime, and 
Jockumsen's continuous violation of rules while he was on his rider, Dr. Perrien 
concluded that Jockumsen was unlikely to comply with the conditions of 
probation. (Id.) Specifically, Dr. Perrien suggested that Jockumsen's 
malingering was motivated by the secondary gain of avoiding imprisonment and 
minimizing the legal consequences of his behavior. (Id.) 
The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Jockumsen, noting a 
concern for the safety of the community, inconsistencies across Jockumsen's 
various statements to the court and his evaluators regarding his remorse and the 
responsibility he took for his crime, and informal discipline sanctions Jockumsen 
had received during his rider. (8127107 Tr., p.32, L.3 - p.34, L.19.) Jockumsen 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.79-81.) 
ISSUES 
Jockumsen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion and violate Mr. 
Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment privilege against self 
incrimination and I.C. § 18-215, when it improperly used 
information obtained for purposes of determining Mr. 
Jockumsen's competency at sentencing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion and act in manifest 
disregard for the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the 
requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte 
order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Jockumsen prior to 
sentencing? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did Jockumsen waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 
by failing to assert it? 
2. Did Jockumsen fail to preserve his claim that the district court abused its 
discretion under I.C. $ 18-215? Even if the claim were preserved, has 
Jockumsen failed to show that the district court abused its discretion? 
3. Has Jockumsen failed to establish that the district court manifestly 
disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32 or abused its discretion by not sua 
sponte ordering Jockumsen to submit to a psychological evaluation in aid 
of sentencing? 
ARGUMENT 
Jockumsen Waived His Fifth Amendment Right Aaainst Self-Incrimination Bv 
Failing To Assert It 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Jockumsen contends that by utilizing his 
competency evaluations at sentencing, the district court violated his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' (Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.) 
Jockumsen contends that this error is evidenced by the district court's references 
to the conclusions of his competency evaluators that he was malingering, and by 
the court's noting of inconsistencies in Jockumsen's statements concerning 
remorse and the responsibility he took for his crime made throughout the criminal 
process, including in his competency evaluations. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12, 
citing 4/3/07 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-13; p.56, Ls.4-12; 8/27/07 Tr. p.30, Ls.9-23.) 
Jockumsen also contends that during his period of retained jurisdiction, 
the district court erred by sending copies of the competency evaluations to Dr. 
Perrien to use as the basis for a follow-up report regarding Jockumsen's potential 
for probation, and by later considering Dr. Perrien's report, which referenced the 
competency evaluations. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-12.) Finally, Jockumsen 
contends that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by attaching 
' Jockumsen does not challenge his sentence on Idaho Constitutional grounds 
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the competency evaluation to his presentence investigation report. (Appellant's 
brief, p.12-13.) 
Jockumsen, however, has failed to preserve this issue, and has waived 
any Fifth Amendment privilege by failing to assert it below. 
B. Jockumsen's Fifth Amendment Claim Is Not Preserved For Appeal 
A basic principle of appellate review is that an appellate court will not 
address an issue that is asserted for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., State v. 
Doe, 123 ldaho 370, 371, 848 P.2d 428, 429 (1993). It is well settled that "issues 
-
not raised in the trial court cannot later be raised on appeal." State v. Lavy, 121 
ldaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992); State v. Garcia, 102 ldaho 378, 387, 
630 P.2d 665, 674 (1981) ("The question was not fairly before the trial court and 
therefore cannot be raised here"). 
Furthermore, the failure by a defendant "to object to reliance on improper 
or inadmissible information in sentencing has generally been held to be a waiver 
of the issue on appeal." State v. Newsom, 135 ldaho 89, 90, 14 P.3d 1083, 1084 
(Ct. App. 2000); State v. Wallace, 98 ldaho 318, 320, 563 P.2d 42, 44 (1977) 
(failure of defendant to object at the trial level to alleged deficiencies in PSI 
constituted waiver of the issue on appeal). 
Although an exception to these bedrock principles of appellate review 
exists if the alleged error constitutes fundamental error, State v. Hasnard, 94 
ldaho 249, 251 486 P.2d 260, 262 (1971), Jockumsen has not argued 
fundamental error in this case. 
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Jockumsen never raised a Fifth Amendment claim below, and repeatedly 
failed to object to any use of his competency evaluations despite multiple 
opportunities to do so. At the first sentencing hearing, Jockumsen's defense 
counsel expressed a knowledge that the "psychological assessments" were 
"before the court." (413107 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-5.) While Jockumsen had the 
opportunity to review the PSI prepared for sentencing, and in fact made multiple 
corrections and objections to its content, Jockumsen did not object to any of the 
PSI'S references to the competency evaluation, or the attachment of his 
competency evaluation to the PSI. (413107 Tr., p.3, L.17 - p.15, L.20.) Further, 
the parties were specifically asked if they had any objection to the district court 
requesting input from Dr. Perrien, or mailing her a copy of Jockumsen's 
competency evaluations. (419107 Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.20, L.5.) Jockumsen again 
chose not to object. (419107 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8.) When Dr. Perrien's reply arrived, 
Jockumsen chose not to object to its consideration - despite not only receiving a 
copy of it prior to the rider review hearing, but being granted a continuance in 
order to further consider it and other materials in front of the court. (816107 Tr., 
p.1, L.18 - p.4, L.7.) Consequently, the district court never ruled on this matter 
and there was no development of this claim at the district court level. 
It is apparent from the record that Jockumsen made a tactical decision to 
facilitate the court's access to as much information about his mental health 
condition as possible. At both his sentencing and rider review hearings, 
Jockumsen, both through his counsel and himself directly, repeatedly referenced 
his mental health when discussing his rehabilitative prospects and culpability for 
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his crime. (413107 Tr., p.18, Ls.6-14; p.24, Ls.1-22; p.37, Ls.22-24; p.38, L.7 - 
p.39, L.6; p.39, Ls.15-21; p.42, L.4-p.43, L.3; 8127107Tr., p.13, L.24-p.15, L.6; 
p.22, L.3 - p.29, L.12.) Jockumsen, in apparent hope for a more lenient 
sentence, allowed the district court to attach the competency evaluation to his 
PSI, send it to Dr. Perrien at the IDOC for review, and consider it at sentencing. 
Now on appeal, Jockumsen wants all prior evaluations excluded and a new one 
prepared. To consider this issue is to invite parties to manipulate the appellate 
process. 
It is the petitioner's burden to raise claims before the trial court. 
Jockumsen failed to preserve his Fifth Amendment claim of error for appellate 
review. and his claim should not be considered. 
C. Jockumsen Waived The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self- 
Incrimination By Failing To Assert It 
Even if the issue were preserved, Jockumsen has failed to show he was 
compelled to testify. "The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, prevents a person from 
being compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself." 
State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143, 44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002). The 
Fifth Amendment speaks of compulsion, and thus does not preclude a witness 
from testifying voluntarily in matters that may incriminate him or her. Minnesota 
v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984). Therefore, in order to enjoy the protections 
of the Fifth Amendment, an individual must generally assert the privilege by 
remaining silent. Id. In cases such as this one, where the defendant did not 
remain silent, the application of one of two exceptions must be shown. Id. 
The first exception applies to custodial interrogations. "In those 
circumstances, the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of incriminating 
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to 
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being [Mirandized]." Curless 137 ldaho 
at 145, 44 P.3d at 1198 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). This 
rule applies, however, only when the interrogation is in a "police-dominated 
atmosphere." Illinois v. Perkins 496 U.S. 292, 295 (1990) (citing Miranda 384 
U.S .  at 445). The second exception applies where assertion of the privilege "is 
penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain silent, and compel a witness 
to give incriminating testimony." Curless 137 ldaho at 143, 44 P.3d at 1198 
(citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984)). Because neither 
exception is applicable to the circumstances of this case, Jockumsen was 
required to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege in order to receive the 
protections thereof. Jockumsen failed to do so. 
State v. Curless 137 ldaho 138, 44 P.3d 1193 is on point. Curless argued 
that the district court erred in denying his motion to exclude a court-ordered 
psychosexual evaluation from consideration at sentencing, claiming that the 
evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
because he was not Mirandized prior to the interview. Id. at 142, 44 P.3d at 
11 97. The Court of Appeals rejected Curless' claim, holding that because neither 
of the two aforementioned exceptions applied to Curless' case, Curless was 
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required to assert the privilege and his failure to do so was "fatal to his claim." Id. 
at 143, 44 P.3d at 1198. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned as 
follows: 
We first analyze whether this case falls under the exception 
for interrogations in police custody. The record in this case reveals 
that Curless was in custody at the time of the evaluation and that 
jail personnel transported him to his interviews with the evaluator. 
Therefore, Curless was in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
However, the record also reveals that the questioning in this case 
did not take place in a police station and was not conducted by 
police personnel. Rather, the evaluator who did the questioning in 
this case was a neutral party appointed by the district court 
pursuant to I.C. 18-8316. Based on the circumstances 
surrounding the questioning in this case, we conclude that Curless 
was not subject to the compelling sort of interrogation contemplated 
in Miranda. Therefore, the first exception to the general rule does 
not apply in this case. 
With regard to the second exception, there is no evidence in 
the record that Curless was threatened with a penalty if he were to 
assert the privilege during interviews with the evaluator. . . . 
Therefore, we conclude that the second exception is inapplicable 
under the circumstances of this case. 
Because neither exception to the general rule applies to the 
facts of this case, Curless was subject to the general rule that a 
witness must either claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination or waive it. Because Curless never asserted the 
privilege, he is not entitled to its protections, and his claim that the 
evaluation violated his Fifth Amendment privilege must fail. 
Curless, 137 Idaho at 144,44 P.3d at 1199 (emphasis omitted). 
As in Curless, Jockumsen was not subject to the "compelling sort of 
interrogation contemplated in Miranda," because Jockumsen's evaluation was 
conducted, not by the police, but by a neutral party appointed by the district 
court. Id.; (R., pp.34-35; PSI attachment, 10/30/06 Dr. Christensen evaluation.) 
Furthermore, as in Curless, "there is no evidence in the record that 
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[Jockumsen] was threatened with a penalty if he were to assert the privilege 
during interviews with the evaluator." Curless, 137 ldaho at 144, 44 P.3d at 
1199. In fact, I.C. 5 18-21 1, the statute pursuant to which Jockumsen's 
competency evaluation was ordered, contemplates the possibility of a 
defendant's unwillingness to participate. I.C. 3 18-211(6). Rather than 
mandating or permitting any type of penalty, the statute merely requires the 
competency report to note the unwillingness, and, if possible, provide an opinion 
as to whether the unwillingness was the result of mental disease or defect. Id. 
The ldaho Court of Appeals has also held that a defendant must 
affirmatively claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when 
answering questions from a pre-sentence investigator, or lose its protection. 
Madison v. Craven, 144 ldaho 696, 700, 169 P.3d 284, 288 (Ct. App. 2007). As 
in Madison, Jockumsen presented no evidence suggesting that during his 
evaluation he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and was nevertheless 
compelled to answer, or that compulsion prevented him from asserting the 
privilege. 
Because the circumstances of Jockumsen's evaluation are strikingly 
similar to the circumstances in Curless and Madison, this court should conclude, 
as the court in those cases did, that Jockumsen's failure to assert his Fifth 
Amendment privilege resulted in a waiver of that right. On appeal, Jockumsen 
provides no authority or argument that his Fifth Amendment claim is not waived 
despite the failure to assert the right. 
Review of the record reveals that Jockumsen did not remain silent, did not 
have his Miranda rights violated, and was not compelled to cooperate in the 
evaluations. Thus, the record demonstrates that Jockumsen suffered no 
violation of his right against compelled self-incrimination. 
Jockumsen's failure to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege with regards 
to his competency evaluation precludes him from attempting to assert the 
privilege for the first time on appeal. This Court should not consider his claim 
II. 
Jockumsen Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
Under I.C. § 18-215 
A. Introduction 
Jockumsen contends that the district court abused its discretion by 
considering his competency evaluation at sentencing, in violation of I.C. § 18- 
21 5. This claim, however, is not preserved for appellate review. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate courts review a criminal sentence under an abuse of standard. 
State v. Callev, 140 ldaho 663, 665-666, 99 P.3d 616, 618-619 (2004). 
Sentences fixed within the statutory limits will ordinarily not be considered an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 284, 77 P.3d 956, 973 
(2003). 
The court on appeal exercises free review over the application and 
construction of a statute, State v. Schumacher, 131 ldaho 484, 485, 959 P.2d 
465, 466 (Ct. App. 1998). When the language of a statute is plain and 
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unambiguous, the appellate court "must give effect to the statute as written, 
without engaging in statutory construction" unless the result would be palpably 
absurd. State v. Jeppesen, 138 ldaho 71, 74, 57 P.3d 782, 785 (2002) (citing 
State v. Rhode, 133 ldaho 459, 988 P.2d 685 (1999)). 
C. Jockumsen's I.C. 5 18-215 Claim Is Not Preserved For Appeal 
As discussed above, a basic principle of appellate review is that an 
appellate court will not address an issue that is asserted for the first time on 
appeal. See, e.g., State v. Doe, 123 ldaho 370, 371, 848 P.2d 428, 429 (1993). 
Furthermore, the failure by a defendant "to object to reliance on improper or 
inadmissible information in sentencing has generally been held to be a waiver of 
the issue on appeal." State v. Newsom, 135 ldaho 89, 90, 14 P.3d 1083, 1084 
(Ct. App. 2000). Even assuming the evaluations were inadmissible, the failure to 
object to their admission or utilization waived this claim. 
Jockumsen never raised an I.C. § 18-215 claim below and, as discussed 
above, repeatedly failed to object to any use of his competency evaluations 
despite multiple opportunities to do so. Jockumsen thus failed to preserve this 
claim of error for appellate review, and the claim should not be considered. 
D. Even If Jockumsen's I.C. 5 18-215 Claim Were Preserved. He Has Failed 
To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencina Discretion 
Even if this issue were preserved for appellate review, Jockumsen has 
failed to show reversible error. The district court utilized the Jockumsen's 
evaluations for a proper purpose. 
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I.C. § 18-21 5 reads as follows: 
A statement made by a person subjected to psychiatric or 
psychological examination or treatment pursuant to sections 18- 
211, 18-212 or 19-2522, Idaho Code, for the purposes of such 
examination or treatment shall not be admissible in evidence in any 
criminal proceeding against him on any issue other than the 
defendant's ability to assist counsel at trial or to form any specific 
intent which is an element of the crime charged, except that such 
statements of a defendant to a psychiatrist or psychologist as are 
relevant for impeachment purposes may be received subject to the 
usual rules of evidence governing matters of impeachment. 
A district court would not violate the plain language of this statute or abuse 
its discretion by considering, at sentencing, statements made by a defendant to 
an evaluator that were not made for the "purposes of examination or treatment." 
I.C. 3 18-215. In this case the district court implicitly found that Jockumsen was 
malingering for the purpose of minimizing his legal consequences or at least, 
found that this was the conclusion of Jockumsen's evaluators. (413107 Tr., p.53, 
Ls.7-13; 8/27/07 Tr., p.30, Ls. 15-23; p.32, Ls.21-25; p.33, L.22 - p.34, L.5.) This 
finding of malingering was supported by Jockumsen's own admissions. (817107 
Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.2.) Malingering, by definition, involves making 
statements contrary to the purposes of an evaluation and treatment, but instead 
for some "secondary gain." (813107 letter from Dr. Perrien.) Jockumsen's 
malingering therefore, since made for the purpose of the "secondary gain" of the 
minimization of legal consequences, is not subject to the protections of I.C. § 18- 
215. Thus, the district court did not err by considering any of the evaluator's 
conclusions of malingering 
A district court would also not violate I.C. 5 18-215 by utilizing a 
defendant's statements that were relevant for impeachment purposes. The 
referenced statements of which Jockumsen complains on appeal meet this 
exception. At Jockumsen's original sentencing hearing, the district court 
referenced the original competency evaluation of Dr. Christensen, stating: 
And the issue about the responsibility, I mean, I was 
reviewing again Dr. Christensen's report from February of this year 
in which he said, that in interviewing you, you reported that you're 
aware of the charges against you, but you said that you don't 
believe them. And you said that you made the admissions to 
having done them so that you would not be incarcerated for a long 
period of time. 
And so, I mean, the fact of the matter is, there are different 
versions and different levels of responsibility that you've taken in 
regard to this. They range from everything from outright denial to, 
today, saying, "I did it, no excuse," to things in between. And so it's 
hard to know where to peg all that. 
(413107 Tr., p.56, Ls. 4-19). The district court was thus utilizing Jockumsen's 
statements to bring into question the veracity of his later comments that he had 
taken responsibility for his crime. Such inconsistent statements are relevant for 
impeachment purposes, and thus the district court did not err by utilizing them. 
Similarly, Jockumsen's malingering was utilized by the district court at 
sentencing to cast doubt upon Jockumsen's repeated claims about the extent of 
his mental illness. (413107 Tr., p.53, Ls.3-20; 8/27/07 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23.) 
Jockumsen's malingering, then, was relevant for impeachment purposes. 
Each of the district court's references to Jockusmen's mental evaluations 
of which Jockumsen complains involved discussion of either malingering, or 
statements made by Jockumsen relevant to purposes of impeachment, or both. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp.11-12, citing 4/3/07 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-3; p.56, Ls.4-12; 4/9/07 
Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.20, L.4; 8/27/07 Tr., p.30, Ls.9-23.) Consideration of these 
factors did not violate I.C. § 18-215. Any concern Jockumsen might have had 
about the utilization of these statements beyond these statutorily permissible 
purposes could have been easily addressed at the trial level. Jockumsen chose 
not to do so. Thus, the district court did not err by considering the statements in 
these contexts, and Jockumsen has failed to show that the district court abused 
its discretion. 
E. Anv Abuse of Discretion Or Violation Of I.C. 6 18-215 Was Harmless 
Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stoddard, 105 
ldaho 169, 171, 667 P.2d 272, 274 (Ct. App. 1983). Because sentencing is a 
discretionary function of the court, an error at sentencing is harmless, "if it is plain 
from the judge's reasoning that the result would not change or if it appears that 
any different result would represent an abuse of the judge's discretion." State v. 
Morczan, 109 ldaho 1040,1043,712 P.2d 741,744 (Ct. App. 1985.) 
In State v. Cope, 142 ldaho 492, 129 P.3d 1241 (2006), the defendant 
objected to the district court's use of his competency evaluation, and the 
testimony of the competency evaluator at sentencing. Cope, 142 ldaho at 495, 
129 P.3d at 1244. The defendant's objection was made on the grounds of I.C. 5 
18-215, not the federal or ldaho Constitutions, and the ldaho Supreme Court 
considered only the statutory challenge. Id. at 495, 499-502. In affirming the 
sentence, the ldaho Supreme Court stated: 
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The district court weighed the sentencing factors of 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the protection of society. 
In a lengthy explanation for its imposition of a fixed life sentence, 
the [clourt discussed all four of these sentencing factors, but clearly 
focused on the primary need to protect society. The information 
used in his district judge's analysis was available to him for sources 
outside Dr. Sombke's report or testimony. 
Id. at 500. The Supreme Court in Cope thus found that an improper utilization of 
-
competency evaluations under I.C. 3 18-215 is harmless, and does not 
invalidate a sentence when the district court considers proper sentencing factors, 
and when information used in the sentencing analysis was available from 
sources outside the competency evaluations. d. at 499-500 
1. In Reachina Its Sentencina Decision, The District Court Analyzed 
The Proper Sentencina Factors 
Like the court in Cqpe, the district court in the present case discussed the 
proper sentencing factors. At both the sentencing and rider review hearings, the 
district court specifically referenced the statutory sentencing factors of I.C. 3 19- 
2521. (413107 Tr., p.51, Ls.14-22; 4/9/07 Tr., p.13, L.17 - p.14, L.3; 8/27/07 Tr., 
p.29, Ls.19-23.) Like the court in Cope, the district court gave particular 
emphasis to the primary sentencing goal of protecting the community. At the 
original sentencing hearing, with regards to this primary goal, the district court 
stated: 
Yours is a difficult case, Mr. Jockumsen, to know what the 
appropriate decision would be by way of sentencing. I have to 
make this assessment under the law about where it is best for you 
to be rehabilitated. I have to consider the need for deterrence, both 
as to you and others. I have to consider the appropriateness of 
punishment. I have to consider the need to protect society, being 
the most important issue. 
Your crime is a most serious one. It inflicted harm upon 
another individual, an individual in a position of trust with you and 
was in a relationship with you. Your actions put her health, and 
indeed, her life at risk. 
The protection of the society, which is the factor that the 
legislature and our courts have emphasized as being most 
important, is particularly important in this case, Mr. Jockumsen, 
because of the nature of the actions that you took towards Ms. 
Blackhawk and the harm that you inflicted on her both physically 
and emotionally and because you have, in your history, conduct 
that involved assault or physical conduct directed at other people. 
2. The Information From Jockumsen's Competencv Evaluations 
Referenced By The District Court Was Available From Other 
Sources 
Also as in COpe, the information used to develop the district court's stated 
analysis of the sentence and rider review determination was available from 
sources outside of the competency evaluations. Most importantly, the district 
court's focus on the sentencing goal of the protection of the community was 
necessarily influenced by factors outside of Jockumsen's competency 
evaluations, since those evaluations did not state opinions or state conclusions 
regarding the danger Jockumsen might the pose to the community. (See 
generally, PSI attachment, 10/30/06 Dr. Christensen evaluation, 11/15/06 Dr. 
Gligorovic evaluation, 2/1/07 letter from Dr. Christensen.) 
Jockumsen's inconsistent statements and disingenuousness are 
evidenced throughout the record, beyond the competency evaluations. The 
district court expressed particular concern with the conflicting evidence of 
Jockumsen's remorse, the responsibility he took for ,his crime, and his attitude 
towards rehabilitation. (413107 Tr., p.56, Ls.4-19; 4/9/07 Tr., p.14, L.22 - p.15, 
L.16; 8/27/07 Tr., p.30, L.24 - 32, L.16.) While Jockumsen repeatedly expressed 
these factors in positive terms during his court appearances and letters to the 
court (413107 Tr., p.47, L.10 - p.50, L.16; 4/9/07 Tr., p.11, L.l - p.12, L.14; 
8/27/07 Tr., p.23, L.25 - p.24, L.16; see generally Michael Jockumsen's letters to 
Judge Bush), his statements and actions outside of the courtroom provided a 
contrasting impression. 
In the context of expressing its concern with these inconsistencies, the 
district court referenced a report filed while Jockumsen was in custody prior to 
sentencing that stated that Jockumsen told a corrections officer that "he could not 
believe the Dludge was going to send him to prison for this," that "he might as 
well go back into pit fighting mode right now" and that "I should have just 
punched her, that would have been a misdemeanor." (4/9/07 Tr., p.5, Ls.7-13, 
p.14, L.22 - p.15, L.16; 4/5/07 deputy report.) The deputy report indicated that 
Jockumsen made these comments on 4/3/07, the same day Jockumsen was in 
court for his original sentencing hearing, where he claimed remorse. (415107 
deputy report; 4/3/07 Tr., p.42, Ls.16-19; p.47, Ls.10-18; p.48, Ls.12-16; p.50, 
Ls.3-16.) 
The district court further discussed these inconsistencies at Jockumsen's 
rider review hearing, in referencing a confiscated letter that Jockumsen had 
written, contrary to facility rules, to an acquaintance on an IDOC computer (APSI, 
p.3): 
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The other thing that I see in here is someone who has 
repeatedly tried to present himself to me through numerous letters 
in an unrealistically positive light and someone who has taken 
different approaches in doing so, which he apparently tied to how 
you may think I may perceive something you might tell me in terms 
of whether you think I may be more pleased if you were to take full 
responsibility for what you did or if I were to be more pleased if you 
could blame what you did on mental illness or if I'd be more 
pleased if I understood that somehow your victim had invited or had 
done something that would make anybody angry to the point where 
they would attempt to strangulate them and inflict some injury on 
them. 
So in that regard, Mr. Jockumsen, I've also noted the letter 
that was attached to the addendum PSI, and that was the letter that 
you did without the expectation that the Court would see it or 
anybody in the Department of Corrections would see it. And it 
would suggest to me, Mr. Jockumsen, that at least right now in your 
life that your belief is that you'd like to - you like the fact that you 
are somebody that can try to make people afraid of you for some 
reason; that you want to go out and commit additional crimes; that, 
at least according to this, you are deeply into Satanism and 
witchcraft, and that's something that you think is really important in 
your life. 
(8127107 Tr., p.30, L.24 - p.32, L.2.) 
Finally, the district court discussed Jockumsen's poor rider performance, 
as evidence that Jockumsen, contrary to his comments in court, was not 
"committed to doing well." (817107 Tr., p.33, Ls.10-22.) Jockumsen's APSI 
indicates one formal, and eight informal disciplinary sanctions over a period of 
less than six weeks. (APSI, p.2). The APSl summarized: 
Mr. Jockumsen has not been responding to progressive 
disciplinary sanctions. He has stated to staff members that he will 
continue to argue, manipulate staff, and violate rules in order to "get 
my way." Much of Mr. Jockumsen's behavior appears to be 
attention seeking or seeking pleasurelexcitement first. He appears 
to be unwilling or incapable of looking objectively at his behavior. 
He does not appear to be amenable to change at this time. For his 
various rule violations, Mr. Jockumsen admitted that he knew he 
was violating an order, but did it anyway because he disagreed with 
the rule. Any time Mr. Jockumsen was "called up" for his behavior, 
he would state that he couldn't do this [rlider and he would be better 
off just doing his time, or would claim mental instability. 
Mr. Jockumsen had a pattern of maladaptive behavior 
whenever staff tried to hold him accountable for his negative 
behavior. He would argue with them, threaten suicide, state that he 
would be better of "just doing his time," or walk off and ignore the 
staff member. Mr. Jockumsen appears to speak in superlatives, 
exaggerating his reaction to even the smallest event. He does not 
appear to be amendable to treatment at this time, even though he 
states that he will complete any program that is given to him. He 
has done a number of self-help books, but his answers show little 
insight into his thinkinglbehavior and seem to be perfunctory 
response. Mr. Jockumsen appears to take delight in being viewed 
as unique "weird" and words hard at projecting this image. 
(APSI, pp.2-3.) Without referencing the competency evaluations, the APSI 
recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, stating that 
Jockumsen "has put little effort into changing any of his thinking or behavior. He 
is too high a risk to reoffend to return to the community at this time. Mr. 
Jockumsen would benefit from a long-term impatient treatment program." (APSI, 
As in m, the district court utilized no statements from Jockumsen's 
competency evaluation to aggravate his sentence. Jockumsen's 
disingenuousness and inconsistent accounts of the remorse he had for his crime 
were evidenced outside the competency evaluations. Any references to 
statements in the evaluations as evidence of this disingenuousness were merely 
redundant. Jockumsen's comments to the competency evaluator did not 
aggravate his sentence. 
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3. Jockumsen's Sentence And The Relinquishment Of His Jurisdiction 
Was Supported By The Record 
Jockumsen's sentence, and the district court's relinquishment of 
jurisdiction, is supported by the record, even apart from any possible utilization of 
the competency evaluations. At the sentencing hearing, Jockumsen 
recommended a period of retained jurisdiction, and the district court followed that 
recommendation. (419107 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-23; p.19, L.12.) While the imposed 
eight year unified sentence with three years fixed was somewhat more severe 
than was recommended by Jockumsen (419107 Tr., p.7, Ls.19-23), this sentence 
was justified by Jockumsen's criminal history, the nature of the crime, and 
evidence of his disingenuousness and lack of remorse beyond the competency 
evaluations. Then, following Jockumsen's extremely poor rider performance, it 
would have been surprising and unreasonable if the district court came to any 
other decision than to relinquish jurisdiction. 
In addition, even if the district court had not made any reference to 
Jockumsen's competency evaluation at sentencing, the state would have been 
permitted, under I.C. 3 18-215, to introduce the evaluations at sentencing for the 
purpose of impeachment. The state would have been permitted to rebut 
Jockumsen's mitigation arguments regarding the extent of his mental illness with 
the competency evaluations, which concluded Jockumsen that was malingering. 
Consequently, regardless of any error associated with the court's use of 
the competency evaluations, the district court would have imposed the same 
sentence. Because the district court would have imposed the same sentence, 
there is no prejudice and any error claimed is harmless. There is thus no basis 
for vacating Jockumsen's sentence. 
111. 
Jockumsen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Manifestly 
Disreaarded The Provisions Of I.C.R. 32 Or Abused Its Discretion By Failina To 
Sua Sponte Order a Psychological Evaluation In Aid Of Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Conceding he did not request the district court to order a psychological 
evaluation, Jockumsen asserts that he district court manifestly disregarded the 
provisions of I.C.R. 32(d) by not sua sponfe ordering such an evaluation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-6.) Jockumsen, however, has failed to establish that the 
district court manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32 or abused its 
discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A sentencing court's determination of whether to obtain a psychological 
evaluation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Collins, 144 ldaho 
408,409, 162 P.3d 787 (2007); State v. Jones, 132 ldaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 
88 (Ct. App. 1999). 
C. Jockumsen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Manifestly 
Disreaarded The Provisions Of I.C.R. 32. 
I.C. 5 19-2522 requires a court to order a psychological evaluation "[ilf 
there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will be a 
significant factor at sentencing.'' I.C. § 19-2522(1). When a defendant fails to 
request a I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation or object to the PSI on the ground that an 
evaluation has not been performed, the defendant must demonstrate that by 
failing to order an evaluation the court "manifestly disregarded the provisions of 
I.C.R. 32." State v. Jones, 132 ldaho 439, 442, 974 P.2d 85, 88 (Ct. App. 1999), 
(quoting State v. Wolfe, 124 ldaho 724, 727, 864 P.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Jockumsen did not request a psychological evaluation or object to the lack 
of such an evaluation before the district couit prior to or at the time of sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, p.15.) Thus, the determination of whether the court erred by 
not sua sponte ordering a psychological evaluation prior to the imposition of 
sentence is contingent upon whether the district court manifestly disregarded the 
provisions of I.C.R. 32. Contrary to Jockumsen's claim on appeal, no disregard, 
let alone manifest disregard, is evident in the record. 
I.C.R. 32 relates the minimum requirements for pre-sentence reports. 
State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 566, 650 P.2d 707, 708 (Ct. App. 1982). I.C.R. 
32(b)(10) requires a PSI to contain the pre-sentence investigator's analysis of 
the "defendant's condition," and states that the analysis "should" include the 
investigator's view of the relevant psychological factors. I.C.R. 32(d) provides 
that while a presentence investigator may recommend a psychological 
evaluation, the decision whether to order such an evaluation is left to the 
sentencing judge. 
As explained by the Court in State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 650 P.2d 
707, 708-09 (Ct. App. 1982), the manifest disregard standard was conceived to 
address such complete disregard for a procedural rule that it "could not be 
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countenanced on appeal without diminishing the reputation of the judicial 
process." Manifest disregard requires more than a mere assertion that 
compliance with the rule was inadequate. Toohill, 103 Idaho at 566-67, 650 P.2d 
at 708-09. ("We will not review a contention, made for the first time on appeal, 
that compliance with the rule was simply inadequate - e.g., that the report should 
have developed a particular point further, or that certain information was 
incomplete or inaccurate. Those are matters to be raised at the sentencing 
hearing.") 
On appeal, Jockumsen argues only what Toohiil says he cannot, that the 
district court's compliance with the rule was inadequate. Though Jockumsen 
makes cursory reference to the "manifest disregard" of I.C.R. 32 standard, he 
merely argues that the record indicates that Jockumsen's mental health was a 
significant factor at sentencing, and that the district court's compliance with I.C. Ij 
19-2552 was inadequate. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-23.) However, because 
Jockumsen failed to request an I.C. § 19-2552 evaluation, he must show more 
than mere inadequate compliance, but a manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32. The 
record shows such "manifest disregard" of I.C.R. 32. 
The state submits that a claim of manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32 should be 
supported by actual evidence of disregard of that rule. Rather than "disregard" 
any I.C.R. 32 requirement that it consider the mental health aspects of this case, 
the district court was fully aware of Jockumsen's alleged mental health issues. 
While the situation was complicated by the evaluators' conclusions of 
Jockumsen's malingering, the district court still gave significant consideration to 
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these issues. The district court took the initiative to directly contact Dr. Perrien at 
the IDOC to request her input on Jockumsen's mental state and rehabilitative 
prospects. (419107 Tr., p.19, L.13 - p.20, L.4.) The district court specifically 
stated that it was considering the mental health factors detailed in I.C. $j 19-2552 
(413107 Tr., p.51, Ls. 14-16.) This active role taken by the district court does not 
amount to any disregard of I.C.R. 32. 
Regarding Jockumsen's mental health, the district court had before it: 
Dr. Christensen's 6-page initial competency evaluation (PSI attachment, 
10/30/06 Dr. Christensen evaluation). 
. Dr. Gligorovic's 4-page psychiatric evaluation, which concluded that 
Jockumsen was malingering (1 1/14/06 Dr. Gligorovic evaluation). 
11/27/06 and 12/13/06 letters from clinician Joyce Carson, who concurred 
with Dr. Gligorovic's diagnosis of malingering. (PSI attachment, 11/27/06 
letter from Joyce Carson, 1211 3/06 letter from Joyce Carson). 
Dr. Christensen's 5-page follow-up psychological evaluation, which 
concluded, "with a high degree of medical probability", that Jockumsen 
was malingering, and that "further psychiatric evaluation and treatment 
would not be particularly beneficial" (1 1/14/06 Dr. Gligorovic evaluation). 
8/3/07 letter from Dr. Marry Perrien. Perrien reviewed the letters written 
by Jockumsen to the court, the competency evaluations, the letters from 
Joyce Carson, a physical evaluation and history conducted by Dr. Joshua 
Nielson, a mini mental status examination by L. McCurdy, the APSI, and 
the PSI, in concluding that Jockumsen was malingering for the purpose of 
attempting to avoid imprisonment and to minimize the legal consequences 
of his behavior. (813107 letter from Dr. Perrien.) Dr. Perrien wrote, "[tjhere 
was no evidence that Mr. Jockumsen has a psychotic disorder which was 
consistent with the objective test data that indicated he was faking mental 
illness." (Id.) 
Proper application of the restrictive "manifest disregard" standard of 
review to the presentence report prepared in Jockumsen's case thus reveals far 
more than mere minimal compliance with the provisions of I.C.R. 32. 
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Consequently, Jockumsen has failed to carry his burden of showing the court 
"manifestly disregarded" the provisions of I.C.R. 32. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Jockumsen's 
judgment of conviction and the district court's sentence and order relinquishing 
jurisdiction 
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